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LIGNITE COAL: A "MINERAL" UNDER Mississippi LAW?
L. Michele McCain & Bernard H. Booth, IV'
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of lignite for the production of energy is by no means a new
phenomenon. In the recent history of the United States, both coal and
lignite were the primary sources of fuel used in the generation of electric-
ity, manufacturing and for heating purposes, and fossil fuels represent
eighty five percent of the energy consumption in the United States. The
use of coal and lignite as a fuel source began to decline as natural gas be-
came the favored source of fuel for production of energy. Natural gas is
typically considered to be a more efficient source of energy than coal,2 and
its movement is less costly. However, interest in lignite as a source of en-
ergy has renewed considerably as the United States withstands the tempes-
tuous oil and gas markets' and finds itself beholden to foreign sources of
fossil fuels, both friend and foe, at an increasingly alarming rate. Only in
recent years has the ownership and mining of lignite become relevant again
in Mississippi.
Current interests in greener, more environmentally friendly sources of
energy to combat the effect of greenhouse gases make the use of lignite a
double edged sword. While the coal burning power plants of yester year
1. L. Michele McCain is a partner with the Energy and Environmental Practice Team in the
Jackson, Mississippi office of Adams and Reese LLP. She concentrates in the areas of oil and gas
litigation, preliminary title opinions and division order title opinions. She also works extensively in the
areas of property law and commercial litigation with experience in real estate closings and zoning mat-
ters. In 2005, Ms. McCain served as President of the Mississippi Oil and Gas Lawyers Association and
was re-elected to the Board of Directors of the Association in 2007.
Bernard H. Booth, IV is an associate with the Energy and Environmental Practice group in the Jackson,
Mississippi office of Adams and Reese LLP. Although Bernard's practice is primarily energy related
litigation, he has a diverse practice with experience in energy and natural resources, toxic torts, environ-
mental class actions, business and commercial litigation, labor relations, and military justice.
Many thanks for the assistance and research are given to J. Jeffrey Trotter, a partner with Energy and
Environmental Practice Team in the Jackson, Mississippi office of Adams and Reese LLP, and Eliza-
beth D. Martin, an associate with the Energy and Environmental Practice Team in the Jackson, Missis-
sippi office of Adams and Reese LLP.
2. Lignite has less than 8,300 British Thermal Units (BTU) per ton. A standard unit of mea-
surement used to denote both the amount of heat energy in fuels and the ability of appliances and air
conditioning systems to produce heating or cooling. A BTU is the amount of heat required to increase
the temperature of a pint of water (which weighs exactly 16 ounces) by one degree Fahrenheit.
3. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, Brent crude prices peaked at $143.95/bbl on
July 3, 2008. Energy Information Administration, "Official Energy Information Statistics from the U.S.
Government: Spot Prices," http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet pri-spt-sld.htm (last visited Apr. 13,
2009). On February 26, 2009 Brent crude closed at $43.18/bbl. The Henry Hub spot price for natural
gas averaged $5.40 per Mcf in January, 2009, $0.60 per Mcf below the average December spot price.
For all of 2008, the Henry Hub spot price averaged $9.13 per Mcf. Energy Information Administration,
Short-Term Energy Outlook," http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeulsteo/pub/contents.htmil (last visited Apr.
13, 2009).
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have been vilified for their harmful emissions, the newer "clean coal" tech-
nology represents the possibility of reducing harmful emissions and de-
creasing our dependence on foreign sources of energy.
You may ask what any of this has to do with whether lignite/coal is
considered a "mineral" under Mississippi law. With renewed interest in the
mining of lignite in Mississippi, questions concerning lignite ownership are
inevitable.
Lignite can be characterized as coal in its juvenile state, and ranks be-
low subbituminous coal. Lignite is commonly used for the production of
electricity throughout the U.S. and at the present time, in 2009, is being
mined in Mississippi. The Mississippi Lignite Mining Company ("MLMC")
began mining lignite in Mississippi in 2000 to supply fuel to the mine mouth
power plant, the Red Hills Power Project ("RHPP").4 The RHPP in Choc-
taw County, Mississippi is the genesis of a Tennessee Valley Authority initi-
ative seeking options for additional power generation. The generation
facility has a net output of 440 megawatts of electricity.' The mine will
supply the generation facility with 3.3 to 3.6 million tones of lignite per year
through 2030.6 Over the 30-year life of the 5,809-acre mine, about 4,700
acres of land will be disturbed: 1,400 acres by mine development activities,
and 3,300 by lignite removal operations. The remaining 1,109 acres will be
used for buffer zones.
Construction of the mine began in September 1998 with construction
of access roads, mine support facilities, a lignite handling facility, tempo-
rary stream diversions, a storm-water runoff control pond, and sedimenta-
tion control ponds.8 Actual lignite mining began in 2000, and the power
plant began generating energy on February 28, 2002.9
Recently, another power generation company filed for a certificate of
public convenience and necessity with the Mississippi Public Service Com-
mission to build a new power plant in Kemper County, Mississippi, also
4. Annual Evaluation Summary Report for the Regulatory Program Administered by the State of
MISSISSIPPI for Evaluation Year 2007 July 1, 2006 to June 30, 2007, Office of Surface Mining Reclama-
tion and Enforcement. Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, Annual Evaluation
Summary Report for the Regulatory Program Administered by the State of Mississippi for Evaluation
Year 2007: July 1, 2006 to June 30, 2007 (2007).
5. Suez Energy Generation GA, "Red Hills Power Plant," http://www.suezenergyna.com/utili-
ties/documents/Red%20Hills.pdf (last accessed Apr. 13, 2009).
6. Annual Evaluation Summary Report for the Regulatory Program Administered by the State of
MISSISSIPPI for Evaluation Year 2007 July 1, 2006 to June 30, 2007, Office of Surface Mining Reclama-
tion and Enforcement. Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, Annual Evaluation
Summary Report for the Regulatory Program Administered by the State of Mississippi for Evaluation
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fueled by lignite."o The new mine mouth power plant will be a coal gasifi-
cation plant constructed with carbon capture capabilities." The seques-
tered CO 2 can be used in secondary and tertiary recovery operations for
oilfields in the latter stages of production.12 The proposed design and tech-
nology represents more environmentally friendly options than traditional
lignite fired power plants by substantially reducing emissions.
"Mississippi lignite resources equal about 13 percent of the total U.S.
lignite resources of 40 billion tons. For the foreseeable future, lignite will
primarily be used for the generation of electricity.""
With what appears to be a renewed interest in lignite/coal, Missis-
sippi's approach to the ownership of these resources also has renewed im-
portance. If faced with deciding whether certain reservations of "all
minerals" includes lignite/coal, the decision reached by our courts may
have repercussions nationally as well as locally if oil and gas prices again
begin to trend upward and Americans are forced to look to alternate
sources for their energy needs.
The debated reservations will likely stem from deeds dating back as far
as the 1920s and 1930s. This is partly due to the fact that thousands of
Mississippi farmers in the late 1920s and early 1930s were unable to pay the
loans on their farms. Most of these loans in Mississippi were secured by
the Federal Land Bank. In 1933, almost 68% of all Federal Land Bank
loans were delinquent. 14 The bank foreclosed on these loans, and made
conveyances of these lands. In the interest of its own solvency, the bank
began reserving one half of the minerals on these lands it obtained through
foreclosures." In Federal Land Bank of New Orleans v. Cooper,16 the Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court upheld the authority of the Federal Land Bank to
make these reservations. It is this type deed, and related reservation, that
is the subject of this article. So, the question becomes, when interpreting
one of these deeds containing an "all minerals" type reservation, would
Mississippi courts hold that the reservation includes lignite/coal?
This is an issue of first impression in Mississippi, so let us start with a
brief background of the term "mineral," which is most typically defined as
follows:
1. A naturally occurring inorganic element or compound
having an orderly internal structure and characteristic
chemical composition, crystal form, and physical properties.
10. Jennifer Jacob Brown, Anthony Topazi: Cleaner Coal in Kemper County, Meridian Star, De-
cember 22, 2008, available at /www.meridianstar.comlarchivesearch/local story_357004807.html (last
accessed Apr. 13, 2009).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, Annual Evaluation Summary Re-
port for the Regulatory Program Administered by the Birmingham Field Office of Mississippi (2006).
14. Statement Regarding The Policy Of The Federal Land Bank of New Orleans With Respect To
The Reservation Of Minerals In Connection With Sales Of Farms Acquired Through Foreclosure.
15. Id.
16. 200 So. 729 (Miss. 1941).
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
2. In miner's phraseology, ore.
3. See: mineral species; mineral series; mineral group,
4. Any natural resource extracted from the earth for human
use; e.g., ores, salts, coal, or petroleum.
5. In flotation, valuable mineral constituents of ore as op-
posed to gangue minerals.
6. Any inorganic plant or animal nutrient.
7. Any member of the mineral kingdom as opposed to the
animal and plant kingdoms.1 7
Similar to the above textbook definition, the Mining and Minerals Pol-
icy Act of 1970 defines "mineral" as follows:
"For the purpose of this section "minerals" shall include all
minerals and mineral fuels including oil, gas, coal, oil shale
and uranium."1
Both of these industry definitions are important because they include
not only coal, but also petroleum and natural gas, which are both argued by
some to be outside of the strict earth science definition of "mineral." How-
ever, it is well-settled in this state that the term "minerals" includes oil, gas
and other hydrocarbons. 19
When discussing how Mississippi may interpret a reservation of "all
minerals" and whether lignite/coal would be included in such reservation, it
is prudent to look to other jurisdictions for guidance. Below, we have
briefly outlined decisions from other jurisdictions, including Alabama,
Louisiana, North Dakota and Texas, which have all addressed this issue.
As you will see, there is contradiction between the jurisdictions, and con-
flict even within the same jurisdiction on this issue. You will see from the
following cases that it is hardly a well- settled issue in any state. Texas, for
example, which Mississippi typically looks to for guidance in the area of oil
and gas law, has likely done the most damage in bringing closure to this
issue and has been harshly criticized for creating title uncertainties regard-
ing near surface minerals and their ownership.
A. Alabama
Coal is mined in significant amounts in Alabama, and the law appears
to be well settled that a reservation of "all minerals" is not ambiguous.2 0
17. Dictionary of Mining, Mineral and Related Terms (United States Bureau of Mines, 1996)
(emphasis added), http://webharvest.gov/peth4/20041015011634/imcg.wr.usgs.gov/dmmrt/ (last visited
April 9, 2009).
18. 30 U.S.C. 21(a) (West. 2009)
19. Singer v. Tatum, 171 So. 2d 134, 142 (Miss. 1965); Cole v. McDonald, 109 So. 2d 628, 630-31
(Miss. 1959).
20. Cantley v. Hubbard, 623 So. 2d 1079, 1082 (Ala. 1993).
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The Alabama Supreme Court adopted a definition of minerals long ago
that encompassed coal, but its broad definition of a mineral has since been
eroded by subsequent decisions. 2' Alabama courts recognized that
"[tihere is no general definition in the cases of the term 'mineral,' and in
determining what is included within a reservation or grant of minerals, it is
commonly stated that the meaning of the term is to be ascertained from the
language of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances evidencing
the intention of the parties."2 2 But Alabama courts appear to trend toward
findings that the words in a mineral reservation or grant should be given
their plain meaning. In Cantley v. Hubbard,2 3 the reservation in question
reserved "all minerals," and despite an erroneous recitation of a prior res-
ervation in the chain of title, the court found that this did not create any
ambiguity and the reservation encompassed methane gas.24 The Hubbard
court cited to Turner v. Lassiter,25 for the proposition that: " 'All' is all.
'All' is not ambiguous. 'All' is not vague. 'All' is not of doubtful
meaning."26
The following year, the Alabama Supreme Court again noted that
when construing the terms of a deed, the court's goal is "to ascertain the
intent of the parties . . . the court must give effect to the plain and clear
meaning of the language in the deed." 27 The court's ruling in Phillips v.
Harris found coal was encompassed in a reservation of "the mineral
rights." 28 The coal rights were expressly reserved by the United States on a
portion of the land. The land was subsequently conveyed to another party,
and the deed in question expressly provided that certain lands were being
conveyed "less and except the coal rights reserved by the United States."2 9
The deed also conveyed certain lands that did not contain the coal reserva-
tion by the United States with the following reservation: "less and except
the mineral rights which are not intended to be conveyed."3 0 The court
found no ambiguity in the deed and construed the two separate mineral
exceptions together to hold that the grantor simply owned all of the miner-
als on the entire property, except for the coal that is found on the portion
of land that was previously reserved to the United States. The court's
21. McCombs v. Stephenson, 44 So. 867 (1907); see W.S. Newell, Inc. v. Randall, 373 So.2d 1068,
1069 (Ala. 1979) (holding that "sand, gravel, and clay are not ordinarily considered minerals unless a
contrary contention is manifested or unless the substance has some special value"); Payne v. Hoover,
486 So. 2d 426, 428 (Ala. 1986) (holding that limestone is not a mineral under reservation of "all min-
eral rights.").
22. W.S. Newell, Inc., 373 So.2d at 1069 (citing U.S. ex rel Tennessee Valley Authority v. Harris,
115 F.2d 343 (5th Cir. 1940)).
23. 623 So. 2d 1079.
24. Id. at 1082.
25. 484 So. 2d 378 (Ala. 1985).
26. Id.
27. Phillips v. Harris, 643 So. 2d 974, 976 (Ala. 1994).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 975.
30. Id. at 976.
31. Id.
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opinion makes clear that an "all minerals" reservation encompasses coal on
the lands not burdened with the reservation to the United States.
As the above cases demonstrate, Alabama courts recognize that coal is
included in a general reservation of "all minerals" and the term minerals
should be given its plain meaning. The parties' intent should be examined
only if the conveyance should contain some ambiguity.
B. Louisiana
Louisiana's coal reserves consist of an estimated 1.0 billion tons of lig-
nite, located primarily in the northwestern part of Louisiana. Lignite was
recognized in Louisiana as early as 1812.32 Louisiana lignite was first used
at the Confederate arsenal near Shreveport during the Civil War, and by
the late nineteenth century, Louisiana lignite was commonly used by black-
smiths, steamboats, and railroads." The first permitted surface coal mine
in Louisiana began production in 1985 to supply lignite to the associated
mine-mouth power plant.34 An additional surface mine began producing
lignite four years later, supplying lignite to the same power plant.
Louisiana looks to the intent of the contracting parties to determine
whether a broad reservation of minerals encompasses lignite, and while the
Louisiana Supreme Court has held that a reservation of "all minerals" en-
compasses lignite, it has conversely held a reservation of "oil, gas and other
minerals" does not encompass the right to strip mine lignite.
In River Rouge Minerals, Inc. v. Energy Resources of Minnesota,3 6 the
Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that a form oil and gas lease conveying the
rights to "all other minerals," did not include the right to strip mine for
lignite.3 7 The court reasoned that the entire lease form was directed to the
production of the oil and gas and referenced the many lease provisions
specifically devoted to the production of oil and gas." The court focused
on the physical aspects of oil, gas, and lignite and held that the grant in
River Rouge was the right to explore for and produce "minerals of the
same physical properties as oil and gas, i.e. those that produced in liquid or
gaseous form by drilling wells . . .[1]ignite coal is not included in the
32. Lignite Resources in Louisiana, Louisiana Geological Survery, Public Information Series No.
5, June 2000.
33. Annual Evaluation Summary Report for the Regulatory Program Administered by the State of
Louisiana for Evaluation Year 2006 July 1, 2005 to June 30, 2006, Office of Surface Mining Reclamation
and Enforcement.
34. Lignite Resources in Louisiana, Louisiana Geological Survery, Public Information Series No.
5, June 2000.
35. Annual Evaluation Summary Report for the Regulatory Program Administered by the State of
Louisiana for Evaluation Year 2006 July 1, 2005 to June 30, 2006, Office of Surface Mining Reclamation
and Enforcement.
36. 331 So. 2d 878 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
37. Id.
38. Id. (the various lease provisions contemplate the construction and burial of pipelines, mainte-
nance of the lease by drilling or paying delay rentals; drilling and reworking wells; pooling and unitiza-
tion; and the abandonment of wells.)
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grant."3 9 This appears to be a distinguishable situation from a deed reserva-
tion as this was interpreting "all other minerals" as it appeared in a stan-
dard oil and gas lease form. When the court was faced with deciding a
reservation under a deed, the outcome was different.
Five years later, in a ruling that seemingly contradicts its holding in
River Rouge, the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that the seller's reserva-
tion of "all mineral rights" included the right to strip mine lignite under the
subject property.4 0 The case involved a conveyance of over 90,000 acres of
timberland after two years of negotiation.4 ' The buyer subsequently
sought to clarify its rights to strip mine lignite on the property.4 2 Although
the court affirmatively stated that the reservation was not ambiguous, it
also took great pains to examine the intent of the parties when they negoti-
ated the sale.43
The court examined various factors to determine the intent of the par-
ties.4 4 It considered that strip mining the land would render the land
unusable for its intended purpose (timber production).4 5 However, the
court noted that the buyer and seller had specifically negotiated the reser-
vation of minerals, and contract negotiations took over two years. 4 6 Evi-
dence was adduced at trial that the seller had consciously refused to
purchase the mineral rights during negotiations.4 ' The court wrote that the
buyer would be held to their decision to "surrender claim to those rights." 48
Additionally, during the negotiations, the seller refused to allow the broad
reservation to be limited by the buyer when the question of removal of
sand and gravel was raised.49
The court dismissed the buyer's argument that the broad reservation
did not include the right to strip mine lignite because it had no economic
value in 1956 when the sale was negotiated, and its exploitation was not
contemplated by either party.o The court found that mineral exploitation
and exploration by its very nature is uncertain, "and the fact that a particu-
lar mineral has no foreseeable economic value at the time a mineral reser-
vation is made is but one factor to be weighed.""
39. Id. at 882.





45. Id. at 432.
46. Continental Group, Inc., 404 So. 2d at 430-31.
47. Id. at 430.
48. Id. at 431.
49. Id. at 431.
50. Id. at 429.
51. Id. at 432. Though one commenter has pointed out that this is contrary to accepted Louisiana
jurisprudence "that a substance must be commercially exploitable at the time of the agreement for it to
be deemed included in a broadly worded grant or reservation of mineral rights." Mark A. Lowe, Louisi-
ana Lignite- A Lumberman's Lament: Continental Group, Inc. v. Allison, 42 La. L. Rev. 1148, 1157
(1982).
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Finally, the court seemed particularly persuaded by the inclusion of a
damage clause providing that the seller would pay for all damages resulting
from the exploitation of minerals from the land.52
After extensive treatment of the parties' intentions, the court stated
simply that "the language employed in the mineral reservation is not am-
biguous."" The words 'all minerals' clearly encompass solid minerals such
as lignite."5 4 The court's statement regarding the lack of ambiguity is con-
trary to the lengthy analysis and extensive treatment of the parties'
intentions.
C. North Dakota
The single largest deposit of lignite known in the world is located in
western North Dakota containing an estimated 351 billion tons. Lignite
mining in North Dakota dates back to 1873, and by 1900, over 70 mines
were operating in the state.
Of all of the cases discussing this issue from numerous jurisdictions,
one of the most analytical approaches used in any case comes from North
Dakota.5 In Christman, the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, through fore-
closure, acquired title to certain lands in North Dakota in 1940.56 On Octo-
ber 22, 1943, the Federal Land Bank conveyed the lands to Emineth
subject to the following reservation:
Excepting and reserving to the party of the first part and its
successors and assigns fifty percent of all right and title and
into any and all oil, gas and other minerals in or under the
forgoing described land with such easement for ingress,
egress and use of surface as may be incidental or necessary
to use of such rights.
This case is instructive because it construes another mineral reserva-
tion from the Federal Land Bank nearly identical to the reservation used in
Federal Land Bank deeds for thousands of acres in Mississippi. Emineth's
successor alleged that lignite was not a mineral within the meaning of
"other minerals" in the reservation. The trial court held that the word
"mineral" contained in the exception of the 1943 deed should be construed
in its ordinary and popular sense to include lignite. Interestingly, the North
Dakota Supreme Court held that the issue of whether lignite coal is a min-
eral was a question of law, not fact, relying on Abbey v. State.ss
52. Continental Group, Inc., 404 So. 2d at 432.
53. Id. at 431.
54. Id. at 432.
55. Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543 (N.D. 1973); Aff'd in Olson v. Dilerud, 226 N.W.2d
363 (N.D. 1975).
56. Id. at 546.
57. Id. at 547.
58. 202 N.W. 2d 844 at 874-75 (N.D. 1972).
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The court next cited its 1946 holding in Adams County v. Smith5 9,
which held that lignite was considered a mineral for purposes of a statute
requiring that all transfers of land by any county reserve fifty percent
(50%) of all oil, natural gas, and minerals.60 The court rejected arguments
that coal is not similar to oil and gas because it is a hard mineral, fixed and
confined to one place, while oil and gas are liquid and migratory in nature.
The court observed that there are as many, if not more similarities between
coal and oil and gas as there are dissimilarities, therefore the rule of "ejus-
dem generis" 61 cannot be applied to exclude coal from the term "other
minerals" without a clear manifestation of the intent of the draftsman.
Again, we see a court stating that lignite is a mineral as a matter of law;
however, in the same opinion, the court will consider such facts as related
to the intent of the parties.
The court addressed the argument that the parties did not intend to
allow the grantor to completely destroy the surface and consequently its
agricultural value by strip mining the coal. In making this determination,
the court stated that "resources must be had to all of the terms of the in-
strument, to the character of the land and of the minerals, and, in cases of
ambiguities, to extrinsic evidence of the surrounding circumstances and
other facts throwing light on the intention of the parties." 62 In examining
the terms of the deed, the court noted that as a general rule, a grant of
minerals gives the owner of the minerals the incidental right of entering,
occupying and making such use of the surface lands as is reasonably neces-
sary in exploring, mining, removing, and marketing the minerals.6 3 This is
consistent with Mississippi law. 64
The court observed that the language in this case is "clear, unambigu-
ous and without limitation. It severs the minerals from the surface of the
land, retaining in the grantor the right to enter and use the surface for any
purpose reasonably necessary to the use of its mineral rights. His rights are
a fee simple estate in the minerals 'in or under' the land in question." 65
Thus, the court concluded that it was reasonable to assume that the parties
intended for the grantor to use the surface to whatever extent reasonably
necessary to remove fifty percent of "all oil, gas and other minerals." 66
59. 23 NW. 2d 873 (N.D. 1946).
60. Id. at 875. See also Abbey v State, 202 N.W. 2d 844, where the North Dakota court construed
the language of another statute requiring "fifty percent of all oil, natural gas, or minerals" to be re-
served to the state, to include coal. Note also the 1959 case of Salzseider v. Brunsdle, 94 NW. 2d 502
(N.D. 1959) where the court construed similar statutory language and noted that "purely organic sub-
stances as oil, gas and coal, are . . . regarded as minerals."
61. "A canon of construction that when a general word or phrase follows a list of specific persons
or things, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only persons or things of the same
type as those listed." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY, 535 (7th ed. 1999).
62. Christman, 212 N.W.2d at 550 (citing 1 A.L.R.2d 787, 789).
63. Id. (citing 58 C.J.S. MINES AND MINERALS §159 (b), pp. 332-333).
64. See Union Producing Co. v. Pitmman, 146 So. 2d 553 (Miss. 1962); EOG Resources v. Turner,
908 So. 2d 848 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
65. Christman, 212 N.W.2d at 550 (citing Northwestern Imp. Co. v. Morton County, 78 N.D. 29,
47 N.W.2d 543, 550 (1951)).
66. Id.
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Although the court pronounced lignite a mineral as a matter of law,
they examined the surrounding circumstances to determine the intent of
the parties. The means of removal that would have been within contempla-
tion of the parties could be resolved by looking at evidence from the North
Dakota legislative research committee in its 1955 report noting that official
records showed that coal had been mined in North Dakota since at least
1884. Prior to 1920, coal was mined almost exclusively by the underground
methods. Since that time, there has been a steady trend toward the use of
strip mining methods, and such trend progressed until 1953 when the last
large underground coal mine was closed. Thus, the court agreed that at the
time in question (1) coal was widely known to exist in the area, (2) it was
reasonable to assume that the parties to the deed in question knew the
existence of lignite in the area, (3) strip mining was the best method of
removing the coal, and (4) the parties intended this instrument to reserve
fifty percent of all lignite.
The court disposed of the argument that agricultural use of the land in
question would be destroyed by strip mining, noting that the legislature
had adopted laws providing for the reclamation of strip mined lands, simi-
lar to Mississippi's Surface Coal Reclamation Act.67 The court found that
strip mining and reclamation would result in restoration of surfaces tempo-
rarily disrupted.
Finally, the court took note that the instrument read "all oil, gas and
other minerals," and that meant "all oil, all gas, and all other minerals."
The court concluded that the words "all oil, gas and other minerals" were
meant to include and do include lignite.
A couple of years after the Christman case was decided, the court
found that a reservation of "all the oil, gas, casinghead gas, casinghead gas-
oline and other minerals" did not encompass coal.68 The ruling was based
on a statute in effect at the time of the conveyance which provided as
follows:
[N]o lease or conveyance of mineral rights or royalties sepa-
rate from the surface rights in real property . . . shall be
construed to grant or convey to the grantee thereof any in-
terest in and to any gravel, coal, clay or uranium unless the
intent to convey such interest is specifically and separately
set forth in the instrument of lease or conveyance.69
North Dakota appears to err on the side of including lignite/coal in
these types of "mineral" reservations unless there is a specific intent (and/
or statute) to the contrary. It is also important to note that the Christman
court acknowledged a reclamation plan to discount any arguments that the
67. See Surface Mining and Reclamation Act, Miss. CODE ANN. §53-7-1 et seq.
68. Reiss v. Rummel, 232 N.W.2d 40, 42 (N.D. 1975).
69. Id. at 43 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-24 (1943)).
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surface owner would lose the use of his land. Mississippi's reclamation act
was adopted in 1977.
D. Texas
The near-surface coal deposits (200 feet) in Texas are roughly 97 per-
cent lignite, with the remainder as bituminous coal. The potential coal
reserves are 23 billion tons of lignite and 787 million tons of bituminous
coal. In the 1840's the first bituminous coal was mined along the Trinity
River of Texas. As early as 1850, lignite was produced and used. Coal from
both lignite and bituminous deposits was used by the railroads until the
1920's. In 1917, coal production in Texas was about 2.5 million tons, with
approximately equal amounts of lignite and bituminous coal. From 1918
until 1950, only 18,000 tons of lignite were produced, but in 1954, a lignite-
fueled electric power-generating plant near Rockdale, Texas opened. Fol-
lowing that, annual coal production increased rapidly to meet the demand
for electric power generation at additional plants. In 2005, over 46.2 million
tons of lignite and bituminous coal were produced in Texas making Texas
the fifth ranked coal-producing state and the largest lignite producer in the
world.
The issue of whether lignite/coal is a "mineral" may have been most
strenuously litigated in Texas, and the confusing results from the Texas
courts are alarming. We address this because on issues of first impression
in oil and gas law, the Mississippi courts often look to Texas jurisprudence
for guidance.7 0 Important to note and remember while reading the follow-
ing Texas decisions is whether these decisions would be considered
"sound" in Mississippi.
Until the early 1970s, Texas followed an "ordinary and natural mean-
ing test" to determine whether the phrase "other minerals" in a grant or
reservation clause covered substances other than oil or gas. Yet similar to
other jurisdictions, Texas also considered surface destruction as a factor in
deciding such questions.
Then, in 1971, the Texas Supreme Court held that iron ore was not a
mineral within the terms of a 1941 reservation of "an undivided 1/2 interest
in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under, and that may
be produced from" a tract of land.7 2 The iron ore underlay the land, and
finding that the ore must be mined by open-pit or strip mining methods,
the court held as follows:
70. Williamson v. Elf Acquitaine, 925 F.Supp. 1163, 1167 (N.D.Miss. 1996) (Mississippi has gen-
eral policy of adopting Texas law in cases involving previously unaddressed oil and gas issues when
satisfied with the soundness of the reasoning.); See also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Millette, 72 So. 2d
176, 182 (Miss. 1954).
71. See Heinatz v. Allen, 217 S.W.2d 994, 998 (Tex. 1949).
72. Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
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The parties to a mineral lease or deed usually think of the
mineral estate as including valuable substances that are re-
moved from the ground by means of wells or mine shafts.
This estate is dominant, of course, and its owner is entitled
to make reasonable use of the surface for the production of
his minerals. It is not ordinarily contemplated, however,
that the utility of the surface for agricultural or grazing pur-
poses will be destroyed or substantially impaired. Unless
the contrary intention is affirmatively and fairly expressed,
therefore, a grant or reservation of 'minerals' or 'mineral
rights' should not be construed to include a substance that
must be removed by methods that will, in effect, consume or
deplete the surface estate.
The court found nothing in the deed to suggest that the parties in-
tended to vest in the grantee the right to destroy the surface, stating that
under these circumstances, iron ore, like gravel and limestone, should be
considered as a part of the surface estate and not as a part of the mineral
estate.
Acker was followed by an appellate court decision in Williford v.
Spies. The Williford court addressed whether a reservation of "oil, gas
and other minerals" included title to lignite coal that was to be excavated
by strip-mining methods. Relying on Acker the court determined that lig-
nite belonged to the surface estate since the parties to the conveyance
could not have intended to define minerals as a substance which had to be
removed by methods that would destroy the surface estate. Unlike the
North Dakota decision, this court found it immaterial that the surface
could be reclaimed by proper methods and restored.
The surface destruction test was actually announced by the court
around 1977 in Reed I and Reed II." The test depends upon evidence
found outside of the four corners of the mineral record to determine the
intent of the parties to the severance, 7 and considers whether there is any
reasonable method of developing the mineral that would not consume, de-
stroy or deplete the surface.7 1 "This requires a two-step factual determina-
tion of the substance's proximity to the surface and the reasonable methods
available for extraction. Ownership is determined as a matter of fact,
rather than by the court as a matter of law." 7  And, in Reed II, the court
73. Id. at 352.
74. 530 S.W.2d 127 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1975)
75. Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W. 2d 169 (Tex. 1977) ("Reed I"); Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W. 2d 743 (Tex.
1980) ("Reed II").
76. Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W. 2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971).
77. Plainsman Trading Co. v. Crews, 898 S.W. 2d 786, 790 (Tex. 1995).
78. Peter Hosey, Title to Uranium and Other Minerals (Still Crazy After all these Years), Vol-
ume 33, Number 2, 67, December 2008, State Bar of Texas, Oil, Gas and Energy Law Section Report.
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held that any deposit that "is within 200 feet of the surface is 'near surface'
as a matter of law." 79
Then, just a few years later in 1983, the Texas Supreme Court aban-
doned the Acker and Reed decisions to determine ownership of near sur-
face minerals, and without overruling those cases, held that "title to a
substance which we have determined to be a mineral is held by the owner
of the mineral estate as a matter of law."s0 In Moser, the surface owner
brought an action to quiet title to uranium. The Texas Supreme Court
abandoned the surface destruction test and redefined minerals as "all sub-
stances within the ordinary and natural meaning of that word, whether
their presence or value is known at the time of severance."81 In an effort to
preserve the stability of title for certain minerals, the court affirmed its
previous decisions that certain substances belong to the surface estate as a
matter of law,82 and the court ruled that near surface coal and lignite be-
long to the surface estate as a matter of law." The court also limited the
ordinary and natural meaning test to future transactions in an effort to pre-
serve conveyances made in reliance on Acker and Reed 11."
In Acker and Reed II, the court relied upon the surface destruction
test. The Moser court determined that conveyances made prior to the deci-
sion were made in reliance on this test. Consequently, limiting the applica-
tion of Moser's ordinary and natural meaning test to prospective
transactions (those made after June 8, 1983) would not prejudice the rights
of parties in pre-Moser transactions which relied on the surface destruction
test of Acker and Reed 11.85 Moreover, the Texas courts have continued to
recognize the surface destruction test in subsequent opinions following
Moser that concern near surface lignite, iron and coal.86 By later applying
a surface destruction test after Moser, the court has contradicted itself by
adhering to Reed II after acknowledging that the surface destruction test
caused title uncertainty. 7
79. Reed II, 597 S.W.2d at 748.
80. Moser v. United States Steel Corp.,676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984).
81. Id. at 102.
82. Id. (citing Heinatz v. Allen, 217 S.W.2d 994 (Tex. 1949)).
83. Id. at 101 (citing Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980) (Reed II) (near surface
lignite, iron, or coal not included in "other minerals" if any reasonable method of production would
damage surface)); Heinatz v. Allen, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949) (limestone and building stone not in-
cluded in devise of "mineral rights")).
84. Moser, 676 S.W. 2d at 103.
85. Kelli McDonald, A Reservation of the Minerals by the State of Texas Includes Coal and
Lignite Even Though Recovery Will Destroy or Deplete the Surface Estate Schwarz v. State, 703
S.W.2d 187 (Tex. 1986), 28 S. Tex. L. Rev. 727, 737 (1987).
86. Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Supp. Ct. Ct. J. 488, 489 (June 12, 1985); Holland v. Kiper, 696
S.W.2d 588, 591 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e).
87. See David Scott, Comment, Determining Mineral Ownership in Texas after Moser v. United
States Steel Corp.-The Surface Destruction Nightmare Continues, 17 ST. MARYS L.J. 185, 211
(1985) (advocating total abandonment of surface destruction test and application of Moser to all sever-
ances of minerals in Texas).
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So, where is Texas after all of this? It appears that Texas does apply an
ordinary and natural meaning test to determine what a "mineral" is; how-
ever, because the courts did not overrule the Acker and Reed decisions,
near surface coal and lignite belong to the surface owner, regardless of
their natural meaning. 8
Based on cases from the surrounding jurisdictions, the only thing we
can be sure of is that we can not be sure what Mississippi would do when
determining whether lignite/coal is a "mineral" under a reservation of "all
minerals." But Mississippi would likely apply any one or combination of
the following "tests:"
1. Ordinary and Natural Meaning: A true application of this
test would only examine whether the substance at issue con-
stitutes a mineral by determining whether knowledgeable
individuals ordinarily and naturally consider the substance a
mineral according to common recognition or general under-
standing. A good example of a true application of this test
was outlined in Cantley v. Hubbard which held that "All is
all. All is not ambiguous. All is not vague. All is not of
doubtful meaning.""
2. Manner of Enjoyment: As advocated by Professor Kuntz:
"the intention sought should be the general intent rather
than any supposed but unexpressed specific intent, and, fur-
ther, that general intent should be arrived at, not by defin-
ing and redefining the terms used, but by considering the
purposes of the grant or reservation in terms of manner of
enjoyment intended in the ensuing interest."9 0 According
to Professor Kuntz, "the manner of the enjoyment of the
mineral estate is through extraction of valuable substances,
and the enjoyment of the surface is through retention of
such substances as are necessary for the use of the
surface." 91
3. Surrounding Circumstances: This test examines a variety
of extrinsic evidence to determine questions such as: was the
substance commonly recognized as a mineral in the area at
the time the reservation was made; what was the business
position of the parties; was there any existing production at
the time the reservation was made; was there any develop-
ment on the property at issue; did the newspapers or other
public circulations advise of the existence of the particular
mineral?
88. Holland v. Kiper, 696 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. App. 1984) (reservation of minerals did not include
lignite found at a depth of less than 200 feet from the surface.)
89. 623 So. 2d 1079, 1082 (Ala. 1993). (citing Turner v. Lassiter, 484 So. 2d 378, 380 (Ala. 1985).
90. Eugene 0. Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L.J. 107,112. (1948)
91. Id.
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4. Surface Destruction: This test excludes all substances re-
moved by methods that would destroy or deplete the sur-
face estate. This test has been applied in Texas, abandoned
in Texas, and subsequently applied again in Texas, and as a
result, it has been harshly criticized as creating title uncer-
tainties. Not only does this test pose problems in applica-
tion today, but as new advances in technology allow
hydrocarbons such as lignite to be mined without complete
surface destruction, these problems are compounded. Con-
sider the following scenario: in 1977, the grantor of a parcel
of land does not own the lignite under the reservation of
"all minerals" because extraction would result in destruc-
tion of the surface. Yet, under the same reservation of "all
minerals" in 2030, the grantor may now hold title to the lig-
nite due to advances in technology, extraction and reclama-
tion, creating better ways to remove the mineral without
complete surface destruction. There can be no good test
that would allow for mineral ownership under the same res-
ervation to be determined differently depending on the day!
By examining the cases from other jurisdictions, and narrowing down
the main "tests" that have been applied in those jurisdictions, it is time to
take a look into Mississippi.
E. Mississippi
The question of whether lignite/coal is a mineral under a reservation of
"all minerals" has never been answered in Mississippi. But since 1954, the
Mississippi Supreme Court has, on several occasions, ruled on the question
of whether a reservation of "minerals" encompassed a particular substance.
In those cases, our court has stated that the word "mineral" has no definite
and certain meaning that can be attributed to it in all cases, and thus the
most reasonable rule is that each case must be decided upon the language
of the grant or reservation, the surrounding circumstances and the inten-
tion of the grantor if it can be ascertained.92 It is well settled in our State
that the general rules of construction, which are applicable to deeds and
contracts, are also applicable to documents reserving a mineral interest.93
In Moss v. Jourdan,9 4 which was later overruled by Witherspoon v.
Campbell,s the Mississippi Supreme Court considered whether gravel was
a "mineral" when the conveyance contained the following reservation:
92. See Cole v. McDonald, 109 So.2d 628, 635 (Miss. 1959) (holding bentonite a "mineral" under
a reservation of "oil and gas or other minerals"); Singer v. Tatum, 171 So. 2d 134, 145 (Miss. 1965)
(holding salt, sulphur and all minerals were covered under a reservation of "mineral rights reserved").
93. Oldham v. Fortner, 74 So.2d 824 (Miss. 1954).
94. 92 So. 689 (Miss. 1922).
95. 69 So. 2d 384 (Miss. 1954).
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It is hereby understood and agreed by the said J. W. Coman,
party of the second part, that the said H. T. Moss and James
A. Moss, parties of the first part, shall have and own all min-
erals that may be on the above described land.96
Two issues addressed by the court were (1) does Moss own the gravel
and (2) if he does own the gravel, does he have the right to remove it if the
removal will destroy the surface of the land?9 7 With almost no discussion,
the court held that Moss did in fact own the gravel based on the language
of the reservation, finding that "it is manifest from the face of the deed that
the grantors intended thereby, and the legal effect of the language they
employed is, to convey the land described therein except all minerals that
may be therein or thereon."9 8 The court, without resorting to extrinsic evi-
dence, insinuated that "minerals" was unambiguous, and as a matter of law,
encompassed gravel.
The second question addressed by the court was whether Moss had the
right to remove the gravel. The court first cited the following rule:
Where one person owns the surface of the land and another
the mineral thereon, the owner of the mineral may remove
it from the land, but in so doing, he must allow sufficient of
the subjacent land to remain to support the surface in its
natural state.99
By applying a "surface destruction test" to determine whether the
owner of a mineral could extract his mineral, the court held that if "the
mineral cannot be removed without destroying the surface, the owner of
the mineral, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, is without the
right to remove it."100 In this instance, Moss owned the gravel but was
without the right to remove it.' 0 The Jourdan court considered the issue of
surface destruction, but not for the purposes of determining the ownership
of the mineral, only for determining whether the mineral owner could re-
move his mineral. This appears to be an early recognition of what was
developed in other jurisdictions as the accommodation doctrine.10 2
Thirty two years after this holding, Moss v. Jourdan0 3 was overruled
by Witherspoon v. Campbell.0 4 Campbell conveyed to Witherspoon "the




100. Id. at 691.
101. This holding was before and is now contrary to the holding in Union Producing Co. v. Pitt-
man, 146 So. 2d 553, 555 (Miss. 1962) ("the right to remove minerals by the usual and customary
method of mining exists, even though the surface of the ground may be wholly destroyed as a result
thereof").
102. However, the recent case of EOG Resources v. Turner, 908 So. 2d 848, 856, n.4 (Miss. App.
2005), held that a mineral owner in Mississippi is not bound by the accommodation doctrine.
103. Moss, 92 So. 689.
104. 69 So. 2d 384 (Miss. 1954).
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surface rights and all timber" in 240 acres in Yazoo County, reserving "all
minerals now owned by me of every kind and nature, both liquid and solid,
with the right of ingress and egress, and all necessary rights for the explora-
tion and development of the same . . ."o Witherspoon farmed the land
and later contracted to sell the gravel from the land for highway construc-
tion.106 Five years after the original conveyance, Campbell sought to en-
join Witherspoon from selling the gravel by claiming to own it under the
original deed.o10 The trial court enjoined Witherspoon from selling, dispos-
ing of or removing the gravel from the land.10
The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the trial court and found in
favor of Witherspoon, declaring him the owner of the gravel.
It seems to be well settled in most jurisdictions that in deter-
mining the meaning of a conveyance or reservation of min-
erals, regard may be had not only of the language of the
deed, but also the situation of the parties, the business in
which they were engaged and the substance of the transac-
tion . . .It also seems to be generally recognized that the
word "minerals" has no definite meaning and certain mean-
ing that can be attributed to it in all cases. 109
The court looked at a variety of extrinsic evidence to determine the
''surrounding circumstances" of the parties.
Considering the situation of the parties in the instant case,
the business in which they were engaged and the substance
of the transaction, it should be stated that the grantor was
not engaged in construction work of any kind that would
render of any use to her the strata of gravel which underlaid
this tract of land, and that any attempt on her part to utilize
the same would result in the destruction or great impair-
ment of the surface rights which she was conveying to the
grantee in the deed of the land to him for farming purposes,
and that since the first oil field in this state had been discov-
ered in the county where this land is situated, five years
prior the execution of this deed of conveyance, the custom
in the county where the deed was to operate was necessarily
that of dealing in minerals as being oil, gas and other like
minerals as distinguished from sand and gravel where no
specific mention of the latter is made in a conveyance, and
that since the grantor was likewise the attorney who pre-
pared both the original and the correction deed which made
105. Id. at 385.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 386.
109. Id.
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no specific mention of sand and gravel, the conveyance
should be construed most strongly against her, after the ex-
clusion of incompetent oral testimony at the trial in regard
to the alleged conversations had between the grantor and
the grantee as tow hat was to be included in the deed.1"o
The court stated that it was overruling Moss v. Jourdan but then quali-
fied the holding by arguably limiting Jourdan to conveyances that occurred
before "the changed conditions brought about by the discovery of oil and
gas in this state."'
We have, therefore, concluded that the case of Moss v.
Jourdan .. .should be and the same is hereby expressly over-
ruled, and that the rule of property thereby established
should not be applied to any conveyances or reservations of
'minerals' that were executed under the changed conditions
brought about by the discovery of oil and gas in this state,
since to apply such rule to those conveyances or reserva-
tions would be manifestly contrary to the intention of the
parties to such conveyances or reservations in the absence
of a specific designation of sand and gravel as being in-
tended to be conveyed or reserved.112
Without expressly adopting a "surface destruction test," the court basi-
cally applied it to the facts of the case. In this instance, it was used to
determine ownership as distinguished from Jourdan where it was used
solely to determine whether the mineral could be extracted.
In 1959, five years after Witherspoon, bentonite was included as a
"mineral" in a reservation of "oil, gas and other minerals. . ."11' The deed
at issue in this case was executed as part of a partnership dissolution be-
tween Cole, Bradley and Young, wherein Cole was to be conveyed partner-
ship assets and land, and each partner reserved a 1/3 interest in oil, gas and
other minerals. 114
Cole later filed suit seeking a confirmation that he owned all bentonite
in the lands arguing that bentonite was not an oil, gas or other mineral of
like kind and character, and therefore, it was excluded from the reservation
and conveyed to him." 5 The trial court confirmed title in Cole to the sur-
face but held that each partner owned a 1/3 interest in the bentonite under
the mineral reservation."16
110. Witherspoon, 69 So. 2d at 386 .
111. Id. at 389.
112. Id.
113. Cole v. McDonald, 109 So. 2d 628 (Miss. 1959).
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The court then distinguished Cole from Witherspoon by noting that the
land in Witherspoon was completely underlain with gravel and removing it
would have destroyed the surface entirely.' 17 In looking at surrounding
circumstances, the court also noted that unlike Witherspoon, oil and gas
were not the only substances that had been discovered in the county.118
During the period, several newspaper articles referenced and called public
attention to the discovery of bentonite in Monroe County.119 Thus, the
court concluded that the parties intended to be vested with a 1/3 interest in
oil, gas or other minerals of any kind or character.120 The court refused to
apply the doctrine of ejusdem generis to limit the scope of minerals re-
served by Young and Bradley.121
Next, in a confusing opinion written by the court in 1965, the reserva-
tion "mineral rights reserved" was held to be ambiguous.1 2 2 In Singer, the
Hibernia Bank executed a deed to Tatum and under each tract description
the words "mineral rights reserved" appeared.'2 In addition, the following
reservation was also included in the deed:
THE GRANTOR HEREIN reserves unto itself, its agents
or assigns, the oil, mineral, gas, and petroleum, on, in, or
beneath all the lands herein conveyed . . .The grantor on
behalf of itself, its agents or assigns, hereby reserve the
usual and customary rights of ingress and egress, over,
across, and upon said lands so situated .. .for the purpose of
mining, boring, or making other explorations thereon and
removing there from such oil, mineral, gas and petroleum,
as may be found.124
In 1962, Tatum brought suit to confirm title to salt, sulphur and other
minerals, and argued that only oil, gas and other hydrocarbons were re-
served in Hibernia. The court's opinion is confusing because it first stated
that the issue presented was a "question of law and not of fact"125 (which
appears to be consistent with Witherspoon and Cole) but then stated that
the reservations of "oil, minerals, gas and petroleum" and "mineral rights
reserved" were ambiguous and that all evidence regarding the surrounding
circumstances would be considered to ascertain the intent of the parties.
The court ruled that Hibernia intended to reserve all of the minerals.
Again, the court distinguished this case from Witherspoon recognizing that
in the latter case, the extraction of gravel would have destroyed the surface
of the land.
117. Id. at 635.
118. Id. at 636.
119. Cole, 109 So. 2d at 636.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 637.
122. Singer v. Tatum, 171 So. 2d 134 (Miss. 1965).
123. Id. at 137.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 141.
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In light of the EOG v. Turner decision from 2005,126 it is also hard to
believe that Mississippi would revert back to any type of surface owner
accommodation doctrine. In Turner, the surface owners filed a lawsuit al-
leging that EOG failed to accommodate their surface interests. Among
other things, the surface owners complained of the location of an access
road and its effect on a proposed cabin that they were planning to build.
The chancellor found in favor of the surface owners and against EOG (for
an amount less than $100,000) and held that EOG's well site and access
road limited the surface owners' use of their property and changed the na-
ture of their property.
In reversing the chancery court, the Mississippi Supreme Court reiter-
ated the following points of law:
1. "[A] mineral owner or a lessee of the mineral estate, in
the absence of additional rights expressly conveyed or re-
served, may use as much of the surface as is reasonably nec-
essary to exercise its right to recover minerals, without
liability for surface damage."127
2. The right to use a reasonable amount of the surface for
mineral exploration and operations "enures to the mineral
estate in the absence of surface leases or other agreements
expressly granting the mineral owner rights to use the sur-
face of the lands." 128
The court specifically stated that the chancellor erred by holding EOG
to a duty to ensure that "the property owners are properly compensated for
the use and damages that result from said exploration activities." Accord-
ing to a bold statement by the court, "this is not the law."
Clearly, EOG had the right to damage as much of the sur-
face ... as was reasonably necessary to its oil and gas opera-
tions and had no obligation to compensate the Turners for
surface damage in the absence of negligence or its use of
more land than was reasonably necessary to conduct its
operations.129
Finding that there was no duty on the part of EOG to accommodate
the surface owners in the absence of negligence or unreasonable use of the
lands, the court reversed and found in favor EOG.
What would Mississippi do if faced with the issue of determining the
ownership of lignite? As stated earlier in this article, on issues of first im-
pression in oil and gas law, the Mississippi courts often look to Texas law
126. EOG Resources, 908 So. 2d 848.
127. Id. at 854 (citing Union Production Co. v. Pittman, 146 So. 2d 553, 555 (Miss. 1962)).
128. Id. (citing Reynolds v. Amerada Hess Corp., 778 So. 2d 759, 762 (Miss. 2000)).
129. Id. (citing Union Production, 146 So. 2d at 555).
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for guidance."'o However, with no great consistency, guidance or sound-
ness from the Texas courts, it is unlikely that the Mississippi courts would
adopt the piecemeal remedy to questions of mineral title adopted by the
Texas courts.
Perhaps the best approach of insuring title certainties in Mississippi is
to follow some type of natural meaning test. For example, if the reserva-
tion on its face is not ambiguous, decide as a matter of law, without resort-
ing to extrinsic evidence, whether a particular substance constitutes a
mineral. As Professor Kuntz advanced, in deeds similar to those executed
by the Federal Land Bank in the 1920s and 1930s, it is likely that the parties
had no real intent at all to sever any specific substance, but instead, in-
tended to separate the surface estate from the mineral estate. And, the law
in Mississippi until 1954, as expressed in Jourdan, was that the term "min-
eral" was unambiguous and would have included lignite/coal.
However, with the ruling from Witherspoon, and with the other rulings
from Texas, Mississippi may fall into the same trap and look to extrinsic
evidence to determine the intent of the parties at the time the deed was
executed.131 This type of analysis leaves the Mississippi title examiner in
the precarious position of divining the intent of parties to transactions
sometimes over a century ago. Undoubtedly, inequities will exist if either
method is adopted. Stability of title is paramount to the efficient exploita-
tion of Mississippi's mineral resources. The inability of a party to deter-
mine whether it possesses the rights to a given substance may hamper
efforts to explore and ultimately exploit the State's mineral wealth. Pre-
sumptive mineral owners should not be forced to seek a determination
whether a particular substance is considered a mineral in a particular com-
munity, county or region of the state. This type of approach is likely to
lead to a fragmented and disjointed body of law and stifle economic
activity.
130. Williamson v. Elf Acquitaine, 925 F.Supp. at 1167 ("there is a general policy of adopting
Texas law in cases involving previously unaddressed oil and gas issues depending of course on 'the
soundness of the reasoning by which they are supported'.) See also, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Millette,
72 So. 2d 176, 182 (Miss. 1954).
131. Cole, 109 So. 2d 628.

